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ABSTRACT

Through an iterative use of the ordinary dictionary, claim construction would be
more simple, cost effective and efficient in serving the public notice function of the
claim. Since the decision in Markman, two divergent methods of claim construction
have emerged; one referring to dictionary definitions first, the other referring to
parts of the patent such as the specification first. Due to the confusion and differing
outcomes the two methods bring about, there came a call by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for clarification. The recent en banc decision in
Phillips reverted claim interpretation back to the method as set forth in Markman.

However, a more efficient outcome of combining the two methods would have been
desirable. This comment proposes an iterative process using a combination of both
methods previously used in claim interpretation.
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PONDERING A "BAFFLING" SITUATION: THE "RECONSTRUCTION" OF CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION*
KAREN C. MITCH**

INTRODUCTION

"It is a fundamental principle of... language itself.., that the meaning of a
word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which
it is used."'
When the United States Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit's ("CAFC") decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., claim interpretation was put in the hands of the judiciary. 2 The
standards for interpretation were left to the discretion of the court, requiring the
court to set forth guidelines that would provide uniformity. 3 As cases were decided,
the standards began shifting until two different methods emerged. 4 This created
5
confusion among the courts, attorneys and patent holders.
In the last decade, there has been little consistency in claim interpretation. 6 The
only thing that has been consistent is the CAFC's reversal rate, which ranges

* George J. Awad & George A. Frank, Fed Circuit Construction Project:Hard Hats Required,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 25, 2004, at 5 (noting that in hearing the Phillips case en banc,
the Federal Circuit is "seeking to bring some clarity to the claim construction confusion" through "a
reconstruction of... the existing methodology").
** J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. General Engineering,
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1996. Thank you to my parents for their enduring
patience, encouragement and support throughout the years; Joanna Gunderson for her meticulous
editing and guidance throughout this process; Amy Booth for forcing me to realize that, no matter
how often one reviews things, perfection is only found in the dictionary; the entire staff of THE JOHN
MARSHALL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW; and last, but not least, to my husband, Ralph
Mitch, for his love, support and ability to make me laugh at myself during the writing process.
1 Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
2 52 F.3d 967, 978, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (concluding that claim interpretation is a matter of law
for the court to decide, not for the jury), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
3 Markman, 517 U.S. 370, 390-91 (1996).
4 See Jennifer R. Johnson, Texas Digital, the Indefiniteness of Language, and the Search for
OrdinaryMeaning, 44 IDEA 521, 522-24, 527-29 (2004). But see Ruoyu Roy Wang, Texas Digital
Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.: Toward a More Formalistic Patent Claim Construction Model, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 153, 153-54 (2004).
5 Johnson, supra note 4, at 521-22. Earlier cases concerning claim construction emphasized
intrinsic evidence, whereas more recent cases have emphasized the use of extrinsic evidence to
determine the ordinary meaning of claim terms. Id.
6 Brenda Sandburg, Court Set to Enter Defining Conflict for PatentBar, THE RECORDER, July
22, 2004, at 1. Michael Barclay, a partner at Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati said that with
regard to reading patent claims "[a]ll district judges and practitioners have been tearing their hair
out . .. . The problem is that three-judge panel cases have been all over the map. There have been
no consistent guidelines." Id. Conflicting opinions by the court seem to be at the heart of the
problem. Id. Many hope the decision in PhiZps will answer the question of when and if a
dictionary should be used in claim interpretation. Id.
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between thirty and forty percent. 7 Since Markman, a decade ago, the CAFC has
applied two diverging standards to claim interpretation. 8 One line of cases holds that
the claim specification should be referenced to determine the meaning of terms in
dispute, resorting to dictionaries only if ambiguities remain. 9 The other line of cases
holds that claim terms should be interpreted by their ordinary meaning as found in a
relevant trade dictionary and only then should the language within the specification
itself be referenced for guidance. 10
Without a settled precedent for claim interpretation, district courts and
attorneys alike had no clear methodology for interpreting or drafting the claims
respectively. As such, the public notice function of the patent system became
ineffective and in turn failed to prevent infringement. 12
A new standard for claim construction was thought to sit on the not so distant
horizon when the CAFC ordered that the matter of claim interpretation be settled
once and for all. 13 The CAFC was searching for an answer to a problem that had
muddled patent litigation for the last decade: How does a court properly interpret the
claim language in a patent?1 4 In the matter of Phillips v. A WH Corp., the CAFC

7 See Christine Hines, Court Mulls Way to InterpretPatent Terms; Phillips'May Be Biggest
Claims InterpretationCase Since Markman, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 16, 2004, at 10 (stating that between

thirty and forty percent of all claim construction cases are reversed by the CAFC); see also Brenda
Sandburg, FederalCircuit Tackles How to Define Patent Terms, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., July
26, 2004, at 1 (quoting Michael Barclay that there is a fifty percent reversal rate of district court
claim construction decisions).
8 See, e.g., Hines, supra note 7, at 10.
Different panels of the Federal Circuit have split on how to approach the issue.
One line of cases says that courts should rely primarily on dictionaries to define
the terms of a patent unless the written description in the patent changes the
"ordinary meaning" of the terms. Another line of cases takes the opposite
approach and says the terms of a patent should be primarily defined by the
inventor's written description and claims.

Id.
9 Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2004); accord
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-85 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
10 Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 865, 876 (E.D. Mich. 2004)
(implying that determination of the ordinary meaning of a word should be the start of the analysis);
accord Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989-90 (Fed. Cir. 1999); CCS
Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 363
F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
11Sandburg, supranote 6, at 1.
12 See generally SmithlMine Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Gajarsa, J., concurring). Judge Gajarsa noted in his concurring opinion that:
[u]nder normal circumstances, one of ordinary skill in the art should be able to
read a patent, to discern which matter is disclosed and discussed in the written
description, and to recognize which matter has been claimed. The ability to
discern both what has been disclosed and what has been claimed is the essence of
public notice. It tells the public which products or processes would infringe the
patent and which would not.

Id.
13 Awad, supra note *, at 5 (noting that the decision in Phillips would result in providing
judges, patent practitioners and patentees with "long-awaited insight" into this confusing practice).
14 See id
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declared it wanted to hear from trade organizations and other interested parties as to
how to properly interpret a claim.1 5 The CAFC then decided the case en banc to
determine the applicable standard for claim interpretation. 16
This comment focuses on the problems confounding courts and attorneys alike in
17
claim construction. The Background section will explore Markman and its progeny,
leading up to the call for clarity and ultimate decision in Phillips.18 The claim

15Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In the court's order granting
an en bane hearing, the court invited submission of amicus curiae briefs with respect to different
issues, including in pertinent part:
1. Is the public notice function of patent claims better served by referencing
primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to
interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the patentee's use of the term in
the specification? If both sources are to be consulted, in what order?
2. If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim interpretation,
should the specification limit the full scope of claim language (as defied by the
dictionaries) only when the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer or when
the specification reflects a clear disclaimer of claim scope? If so, what language
in the specification will satisfy those conditions? What use should be made of
general as opposed to technical dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary
meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same term? If
the dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable definitions for a term, is it
appropriate to look to the specification to determine what definition or definitions
should apply?
3. If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification, what
use should be made of dictionaries? Should the range of the ordinary meaning of
claim language be limited to the scope of the invention disclosed in the
specification, for example, when only a single embodiment is disclosed and no
other indications of breadth are disclosed?
4. Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority and
dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting approaches,
should the two approaches be treated as complementary methodologies such that
there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a patentee must satisfy both
limiting methodologies in order to establish the claim coverage it seeks?
5. When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole
purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112?
Id. The concurring judge also questioned if'.
[c]laim construction [is] amenable to resolution by resort to strictly algorithmic
rules, e.g., specification first, dictionaries first, etc.? Or is claim construction
better achieved by using the order or tools relevant in each case to discern the
meaning of terms according to the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the invention, thus entrusting trial courts to interpret claims as
a contract or statute?
Id. at 1384.
16See Steve Pollinger, A Battle for DefinitionalSupremacy in PatentLanguage Disputes,TEX.
LAW., Sept. 27, 2004. See also Harold C. Wegner, DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW 2004, 4 J.
MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2004).
17See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd,517
U.S. 370 (1996); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1581-82; Johnson, 175 F.3d at 990; Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram
Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001); CCSFitness,288 F.3d at 1365-66; Telegenix, 308 F.3d
at 1201-02, 1205; Honeywell, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 875; Eon Labs, 363 F.3d at 1308; Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated,376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
18Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Phillips v. AWH, No. 031269, 1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954, at *15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005).
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interpretation process as set out in Markman is reviewed, laying out the specific
rules of interpretation that were declared therein. The Analysis section will discuss
the two divergent lines of cases following the Markman decision, identifying the
problems inherent in each line.
Finally, this comment will propose that in order for claim interpretation to be
meaningful, the CAFC must unite these differing lines of cases. The CAFC must lay
out rules that offer a clear roadmap which provides attorneys and judges alike with
direction when interpreting claims. This solution assures consistency and serves to
both uphold and clarify the public notice function of the patent system.

I.BACKGROUND
A. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.: ObtainingLandmarkStatus
In 1996, in the Markman case, the United States Supreme Court declared
that "the construction of a patent, including the terms of art within its claim, is
exclusively within the province of the court." 19 The case has since become the
20
landmark case in claim construction.
As Markman explains, one of a patent's functions is to serve as notice to the
public of the invention. 21 This function is required by statute. 22 If the patent does
not include enough information to put the public on notice of the invention, it risks
infringement without repercussion.23 Since the patent is written from the position of
a person having ordinary skill in the art ("PHOSITA"),24 judges are required to
25
interpret the language from that perspective.
Furthermore, a patent is required to contain precise terms that will allow a
PHOSITA to make and use the invented product or method. 26 When confusion

19Markman, 517 U.S. at 372 (affirming the Federal Circuit's holding that interpretation of
claim language is a question of law to be determined by the courts).
20 The vast majority of cases since the decision in Markman, declaring the interpretation of
claim language as a process for the court, have followed the interpretation standards set forth in
that opinion. See, e.g., Vitronies, 90 F.3d at 1581-82; Johnson, 175 F.3d at 990; Rexnord, 274 F.3d
at 1343-44; CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1365-66; Tleenix,308 F.3d at 1201-02, 1205; Honeywell,
330 F. Supp. 2d at 875; Eon Labs, 363 F.3d at 1308; Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1211.
21 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373.
22 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
23 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(B) (2000) (stating that a patent holder is entitled to royalties from an
infringer who had notice of the patent).
24 See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 41 (2003). PHOSITA is an
acronym commonly used to designate the hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art. Id.
25 Id.
26 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). In relevant part, the statute sets forth that:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention .... An element
in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a
specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support
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results about the scope of the patent, and a court proceeding ensues, the terms set
27
forth in the patent claim necessarily require interpretation.
In Markman, there was a claim dispute arising from the interpretation of the
word "inventory."28 The CAFC declared that claim construction, which includes
interpretation of the meaning and extent of disputed terms, is the first step in an
29
infringement analysis.
The CAFC determined that in order to properly interpret a claim, the
intrinsic record should be considered first.30
This requires consulting the
specification to determine if the meaning of terms may be deduced from the
specification language.3 1 If clarity cannot be achieved through the language of the
specification alone, then the court may consider outside sources, including
dictionaries, to provide insight into the meaning of a term.3 2 Through this process,
33
the meaning of a claim may be properly and objectively determined.

B. Diverging Views: The Decomposition of Claim Construction
As early as Markman, the CAFC raised concern over the need for consistency
in interpretation of patent claims.

34

The CAFC's concern was not unwarranted. As

three-judge panels heard cases following what was considered to be the landmark
35
case for claim interpretation, two divergent methods of interpretation unfolded.
The main dispute between these two methods concerned the use of extrinsic
36
evidence, specifically dictionaries.

thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.

Id.
27 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 974-75 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
28 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S.
370 (1996).
29 Id. at 976 (stating that an infringement analysis entails two steps, the first being to
determine the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed).
30 See MUELLER, supra note 24, at 231. Intrinsic evidence is the part of the patent that is

public record. Id. It includes the prosecution history and the patent itself. Id. It is important
because this information is available as soon as the patent is issued. Id.; see also Markman, 52
F.3d at 979 (stating that in order to ascertain the meaning of claims, the court considers three
sources: (1) the claims; (2) the specification; and (3) the prosecution history).
'31See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The case states that claims should be read "in view of the
specification of which they are a part." Id. The specification should necessarily contain a written
description of the invention that enables a PHOSITA to make and use the invention. Id. "For claim
construction purposes, the description may act as a ...dictionary, which explains the invention"
and defines terms. Id. The implication of this is that the specification language should be looked at
first to interpret the meaning of a term. See id.
'32
Id. at 981. However, the court noted extrinsic evidence is used only to enhance the court's
understanding of the patent itself, not to vary or contradict the terms found in the claims. Id.
33Id. at 986.
34Id.at 979.
3,See Johnson, supra note 4, at 522-23; see also Sandburg, supranote 6, at 1.
36See MUELLER, supra note 24, at 231. Extrinsic evidence is defined as evidence that is not
included in the claim itself. Id.,* see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980
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1. FindingMeaning Within the Architecture
The line of cases following the first method of how to deal with claim
construction considers the specification language first in determining the meaning of
disputed terms.3 7 Under this method, the importance of the language itself is
emphasized because it is specifically chosen by the patentee and the surrounding
language can color the terms of the claim. 38 As such, this method attempts to reduce
39
the need for any other sources outside the patent.
In Vitronics v. Coneeptroni, the CAFC was able to determine the intended
meaning of the claim term from the specification, thus avoiding the use of any
outside sources. 40 The CAFC noted that although there was no need to consider
sources beyond the language of the specification in the case, it would have been
acceptable to refer to extrinsic evidence, including dictionaries, if the meaning was
not independently discernable from the patent. 41 However, the CAFC stressed that
the use of extrinsic evidence should be a last resort to define the meaning of the claim
terms and should not be used for any purpose other than to provide an
understanding of the language as used within the claim. 42 In other words, a
dictionary should not be used to define the meaning of a term unless absolutely
43
necessary.

2. DeterminingMeaningfrom a Dictionary(or OtherExtrinsic Sources)
The method of consulting the claim specification first, and only to extrinsic
evidence if there is still ambiguity, has been repeated numerous times over the last

(Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). However, the court states that "[e]xtrinsic evidence
consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor
testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises. This evidence may be helpful to explain scientific
principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of art that appear in the patent and
prosecution history." Mnrkmnn, 52 F.3d at 980.
'37 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Following
Markman, Vitronics established another line of cases that has been consistently followed and
propounds the idea that the intrinsic record should be looked at first to determine the scope of the
claim language. Id. Only after the specification is exhausted should a dictionary be turned to, if at
all, to aid in ridding the terms of any ambiguity. Id. at 1583.
38 Id. at 1582 (stating that a patentee may define his own terms in any manner he chooses,
whether they conform to the ordinary meaning or not).
39 Id.at 1583 (reasoning that if the intrinsic record is able to resolve any ambiguity, then not
only is there no reason to look to extrinsic evidence, but it is improper to do so).
40Id.at 1584 (concluding that when taken in the context of the patent specification, the term
"solder reflow temperature" was unambiguous and no ambiguities remained; therefore, the trial
court should have ended its analysis).
41Id. at 1583 ("In construing the claims we look to the language of the claims, the specification
and the prosecution history. Extrinsic evidence may also be considered, if needed to assist in
determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims.").
42 Id. (reasoning that when there is no ambiguity in the public record, and the scope of the
invention is fully described, the court should not look at extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning
of a term).
43See

id.
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decade. 44 However, even with the procedures set forth in applicable case law, there
has been some confusion in its application. 45 For instance, Nystrom v. Trex Co.
required interpretation of the word "board".46 Although the majority opinion set out
the governing rules for interpretation and stressed the need to consult the
47
specification for the meaning of the term, the court did not follow those rules.
Instead, the majority went directly to the dictionary to determine the plain and
48
ordinary meaning of the term.
This method of referring to a dictionary at the outset of the interpretation

4 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996) (claim language should be the foremost tool used for interpretation); see also
Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582 (putting emphasis on drawing meaning of disputed terms from the claim
specification); Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (advocating
that the claim language should be investigated first, and if ambiguities still exist, dictionaries may
be used to aid in interpretation); Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (claim construction should be the focus of interpretation); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v.
Abbott Labs, 375 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that claim language is the first place to
look to determine the intended meaning of a term).
45 Awad, supra note *, at 5 ("Although seemingly straightforward, the application of this
methodology can be confusing . . . . Sometimes the Federal Circuit has accorded more weight to
dictionary definitions than the patent specification and vice versa.").
46 Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
In Nystrom, the patent
specification described the invention as:
an exterior wood flooring board shaped to shed water from its upper surface while
at the same time providing a surface on which it is comfortable to walk and stand
[The] decking board ... also yields a superior product when cut from a log,
reducing the amount of scrap in the outermost boards cut from a log.
Id.
The court proceeded to look to the dictionary for the definition of the term "board and
determined that a "board" is "an elongated, flat piece of wood or other rigid material." Id. at 111214.
47 Id. at 1111. The court stated:
We begin our claim construction analysis with the words of the claim ....
In
construing claims, the analytical focus must begin and remain centered on the
language of the claims themselves ... . In the absence of an express intent to
impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their
ordinary meaning ... . The ordinary meaning must be determined from the
standpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art ....
The ordinary and
customary meaning may be determined by reviewing a variety of sources,
including the claims themselves; dictionaries and treatises ....
The ordinary and
customary definition will be overcome if the patentee has acted as his or her own
lexicographer in explicitly setting forth a definition of a claim term distinct from
its ordinary meaning.
Id. The court strayed from these rules, however, in that they began by defining the term "board"
through the use of a dictionary and then turned to the claim to make the dictionary definition fit.
Td. As the dissent argues, the consultation of the claim first to determine if the meaning of the term
is ascertainable by the language within the claim is proper because "the description may act as a
sort of dictionary." Nystrom, 374 F.3d at 1123 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
48 Nystrom, 374 F.3d at 1120 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (stating that the predicament in this
case is that the majority stated the proper interpretation rules; however, instead of following the
rules, the majority referred to the dictionary for the meaning of the word "board"). Contra, Td. at
1111 n.1 (declaring that the dissent is downplaying the statutory requirement of focusing on the
words of the claims by stressing the importance of the written description and prosecution history).
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process provides its own unique problems. 49 These include confusion when there are
multiple definitions for a single term, 5° misinterpretation if the incorrect dictionary is
used and a possible change away from intended meaning of the term that would be
illustrated if the specification were referenced first. 51 In addition, the ordinary
meaning as provided by a dictionary may not be adequate to encompass the special
meaning the patent requires. 52 Thus, it may be improper to consult to dictionaries
first.5,

C. ReconstructionRequired
Patent statutes call for claim language to be clear and precise so that a
PHOSITA can discern the correct meaning of terms within the claim. 54 The claim
language not only serves to define the metes and bounds of the patent, but is also

49 See Brenda Sandburg, PedanticPatent Reviews Panned,THE RECORDER, Sept. 22, 2004, at
1. The amicus curiae brief filed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") outlines the many
problems with the court relying on dictionary definitions. Id.
50Dictionaries provide multiple definitions for the word "board":
board n. 1. A long flat slab of sawed lumber; a plank. 2. A flat piece of wood or
similarly rigid material adapted for a special use. 3. Games A flat surface on
which a game is played. 4. The hard cover of a book. 5. boards A theater stage.
6a. A table, especially one set for serving food. b. Food or meals considered as a
whole: board and lodging. 7. A table at which official meetings are held; a
council table. 8. An organized body of administrators or investigators: a board of
trustees,'a board of directors. 9. An electrical-equipment panel. 10. Computer
Science A circuit board. 11. Sports a. A scoreboard. b. A tote board. c. boards
The wooden structure enclosing an ice hockey rink. d. A diving board. e. A
surfboard. f. A snowboard. 12. Basketball a. A backboard. b. A rebound. 13.
Nautical a. The side of a ship. b. A leeboard. c. A centerboard. 14. Obsolete A
border or an edge. 15. A usually large, vertically positioned flat surface used for
writing or posting, especially: a. A blackboard. b. A bulletin board ....
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 203 (4th ed. 2000).
board /bawrd/n. & v. 1 a a flat thin piece of sawn lumber, usu. long and narrow.
b a piece of material resembling this, made from compressed fibers. c a thin slab
of wood or a similar substance, often with a covering, used for any of various
purposes (chessboard,ironing board. d thick stiff cardboard used in bookbinding.
2 the provision of regular meals, usu. with accommodation, for payment. 3
archaic a table spread for a meal. 4 the directors of a company, any other
specially constituted administrative body, e.g., a committee or group of
councilors, examiners, etc....
THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 100 (1999).

51 Sandburg, supra note 6, at 1 (quoting PTO General Counsel James Toupin stating that
'[t]he increased reliance on dictionary definitions as a foundation for claim meaning has generated
inconsistent and unpredictable results"). Generally, since there are so many dictionaries to choose
from, the concern raised with dictionary use is that there are too many different definitions, thus the
chosen definition may be too broad, or it may be too narrow. Id.
52 Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (reiterating
that since dictionaries provide multiple definitions for words, some which are unrelated to the
invention, intrinsic evidence must be considered to determine which of the dictionary definitions are
consistent with the inventor's intended definition).
53 See Te]egeix, 308 F.3d at 1203.
54 Id.
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where the problems begin. 55 Following Markman, the two differing methods that
emerged to interpret claims showed a lack of concurrence on how to proceed with
claim interpretation. 56 This made compliance with the public notice function of the
statute difficult to achieve. Without one procedure for interpretation, the public will
not know whether a court will consult the specification first to derive the meaning of
terms or first refer to the ordinary meaning of the term via a dictionary. Hence, the
public will be unsure of the viability of possible new inventions it wishes to create.
Because the panels of the CAFC could not agree as to which came first, using a
dictionary to ascertain the ordinary meaning of a word or consulting the language in
the specification for clarification of ambiguous terms, there was uncertainty in the
57
laws of claim construction.
Some of the underlying difficulties arise because it is unclear whether a
dictionary is intrinsic or extrinsic evidence. 58 If dictionaries are extrinsic, they
should only be consulted after considering the specification. 59 If they are not
extrinsic, they can be an invaluable tool for the judge when determining how a
60
PHOSITA might interpret the terms before referring to the specification, if at all.
Uncertainty in claim interpretation causes attorneys to spend extra time
creating the claim language, costing their clients more money. 61 The excess cost

5 See MUELLER, supra note 24, at 14. Metes and bounds mark the boundaries of the statutory
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented
invention in the United States during the term of the patent. Id.
56 See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (claim language should be the foremost tool used for interpretation).
Compare Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (putting
emphasis on drawing the meaning of disputed terms from the claim specification), and Johnson
Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating there is a heavy
presumption that claim terms carry their ordinary and accustomed meaning, which is typically
found in a dictionary), and Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(advocating that the claim language should be investigated first, and if ambiguities still exist,
dictionaries may be used to aid in interpretation), and CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288
F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (differentiating when the dictionary meaning results in the
ordinary meaning and when the claim should be examined first), with Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (declaring claim construction should be
the focus of interpretation; however, the terms of the claim carry the burden of a heavy presumption
of the ordinary meaning), and Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 865, 876
(E.D. Mich. 2004) (stating that for analysis, dictionaries should be consulted prior to sifting through
the claim language), and Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 363 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (advocating the dictionary is the first place to look to determine the ordinary meaning of a
term), and Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (calling for briefs to
determine which interpretation approach is best).
57 Sandburg, supranote 6, at 1.
F, See MUELLER, supra note 24, at 231. Although dictionaries are literally extrinsic to the
record, dictionaries might sometimes properly reflect the ordinary use of the information contained
in the record. Id. This has led the courts to begin accepting use of dictionaries to aid judges in
determining how a PHOSITA would interpret claim language. Id.
,DId.
(o Id.

(31 See Am. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N. 2003 Report of the Economic Survey 20, 22 (2003)
[hereinafter AIPLA Report]. The tables on page 20 show the average charge for services range from
$200 for a maintenance fee to as much as $10,001 for the original application of a relatively complex
biotech/chemical patent. Id. at 20. The initial novelty search costs an average of $1,500, with the
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occurs in creating language that would satisfy both methods of interpretation. 62
This, as well as confusion on the proper application of dictionaries to claim
interpretation, led the CAFC to inquire what the proper methodology for claim
63
interpretation should be in Philhjps.

II. ANALYSIS
This section will discuss the two differing methods of claim interpretation
that have emerged since Markman. It will closely analyze the how the methods
prescribed in Vitronies Corp. v. Coneeptronie, Inc. ("Vitronicg') and Texas Digital
Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc. ("Telegeni"C) differ in the way the specification and
dictionaries are applied in claim interpretation. Finally, the recent en banc decision
in Phillips will be discussed.

A. Specification as the ControllingInstrument for Claim Construction: Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.
One year after Markman, the CAFC made a ruling in Vitronies that further
6 4
established one method of claim interpretation.
In Vitronies, the CAFC considered the issue of claim interpretation in a patent
infringement context. 65 The dispute was over the meaning of a "solder reflow
temperature" limitation as used in describing the process of using ovens to solder
electrical devices to printed circuit boards. 66 Vitronics Corporation ("Vitronics")
manufactured these ovens and owned U.S. Patent No. 4,654,502 ("the
'502
patent").67 The '502 patent covered the method for soldering the devices to the
boards. 68 Conceptronic, Inc. ("Conceptronic"), the alleged infringer, sold a similar

total cost of a non-provisional application for an invention that is minimally complex being $5,504.
Id. The tables on page 22 show the average expenses for patent litigation to range from $500,000 for
a suit involving less than $1 Million at risk to $3,995,000 for a suit involving more than $25 Million
at risk. Id. at 22.
62 See Hines, supra note 7, at 10. The author states that not only will this decision provide a
clear and uniform method for interpretation, but that this will lead to a more cost effective way to
construe and interpret patents. Id. From this, it is logical to deduce that the current system for
claim interpretation is a labor intensive process, resulting in excessive attorney's fees and
inconsistent analysis. See id.
6 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
61 See generallyVitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
6 Id. at 1581-82.
66 -d. at 1579. The patented process uses ovens to solder electrical devices such as capacitors,
resistors and electrical devices to the circuit boards as they pass through on a conveyor belt. Id. at
1578-79.
67 Id. at 1578.
68 Id.
at 1579. The pertinent part of the claim in dispute is as follows:
1... . moving said board through a third zone and in close proximity to a third
emitting surface of at least one nonfocused infrared panel emitter, said third
surface being at a third panel temperature higher than said second panel
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line of ovens. 69 The issue discussed in this case was whether Conceptronic's line of
70
ovens infringed the '502 patent.
Vitronics supplied the jury instructions at the trial level, which included a
definition of the disputed term.71 While Vitronics asserted that the "solder reflow
temperature" was the peak reflow temperature, Conceptronic asserted that the
"solder reflow temperature" was 183 degrees Celsius (the liquidus temperature of a
particular type of solder).72 Vitronics supported its arguments with the language of
the specification.7 3 Conceptronic derived its interpretation of the term through a
74
memorandum obtained from Vitronics.
In determining the process for interpretation of the disputed terms, the CAFC
relied on Markman, concluding that intrinsic evidence should be considered first
since not only is the scope of the invention defined with it, but the specification, part
of the intrinsic evidence, provides the best source for ascertaining the intended
meaning of the disputed term. 75 Since a patentee may act as his own lexicographer,
it is appropriate to consult the patent first to see if he has employed his own

temperature, said third emitting surface heating said board and said solder to a
solder ref7ow temperaturefor a period of time sufficient to cause said solder to
reflow and solder said devices to said board while maintaining the temperature of
said devices below sid solderfellow temperature.
Id.
(39
Id.
70 Id.

71 Id. at 1579-80. The instruction given to the jury included the definition as being "the
temperature reached by the solder during the period it is reflowing during the final stages of the
soldering process, sometimes referred to as the 'peak solder reflow temperature.' It does not mean
the 'liquidus temperature,' the temperature at which the solder first begins to melt." Id.
72 Id. The type of solder Conceptronic referred to in obtaining this temperature is 63/37
(Sn/Pb) solder. Id.
73Id.at 1580-81. The part of the specification Vitronics referred to stated, in pertinent part:
The solder may be, for example, 60/40 (Sn/Pb), 63/37 (Sn/Pb), or 62/36/2
(Sn/Pb/Ag), all which have a liquidus temperature (i.e.
begin to melt) of about 190
degrees C. and a peak reflow temperature of about 210 degrees-218 degrees C.
Thus, to effect reflow soldering without damaging the board, the solder must be
allowed to reach a temperature of at least 210 degrees C., but the board cannot
reach a temperature of 225 degrees C.
The board is then sent into a fifth zone 5 to bring the temperature of
approximately 210 degrees C., the devices up to approximately 195 degrees C.,
and the solder up to approximately 210 degrees C. for a period of time of from
about 10 to 20 seconds to cause the solder to flow. Because the devices are cooler
than the board, the solder flows up the devices ... . The board spends
approximately 60 seconds in the fifth zone, but only about 10 to 20 seconds at 210
degrees C. Thus, the board is at the solder reflow temperature for only a short
period of time and the devices never reach the solder reflow temperature.
Id. at 1580-81.
74 Id. at 1581. This memorandum was used by Conceptronic because it referred to the
"liquidus" and "reflow" temperature as being the same. Id. The court did not agree with this
argument because the statement was in the background section of the memorandum and was
defined differently later within the same document. Id.
7,Id.at 1581-82.
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definition, either explicitly or implicitly. 76 The statutory requirements77 of the
''
specification make it "highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. b
Ambiguities will usually be resolved by referring to the intrinsic evidence, negating
the need for referring to extrinsic evidence.7 9 The CAFC determined that if there are
no remaining ambiguities in the language, it is improper to consult extrinsic
80
evidence.
The underlying policy behind this method of interpretation is that claims must
serve as notice to the public of the invention.8 1 The claims should therefore be
interpreted as intended by the patentee, as indicated in the specification; otherwise,
the meanings of the claims indiscriminately change, making the public notice
function ineffective82
The CAFC held the term "solder reflow temperature" to mean the "peak flow
temperature" rather than the "liquidus temperature" because it was distinctly
defined as such within the specification.8 3 By construing the term in this way, the
public notice function was served because the language came directly from the patent
84
itself; any other interpretation might have defeated the notice function.
The CAFC stressed that when ambiguities are resolved by consulting the
intrinsic evidence, the analysis should stop there.8 5 Extrinsic evidence should only be
86
relied upon when ambiguities remain after consideration of the intrinsic evidence.
Furthermore, even when extrinsic evidence is used, it should only serve to aid in
understanding the terms, not to refute or alter the claim language.8 7 Such a method
preserves the public notice function because an individual reading the patent would
88
read only the patent documents, not extrinsic sources, to understand the patent.
The problem with extrinsic evidence is that when it is used for interpretation by the
89
court, the public may not have access to the same sources the court uses.

76 Id. at 1582 (stating that "a patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms
in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, as long as the special definition of the term is
clearly stated in the patent specification").
77 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
78 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
7') Id. at 1583.
80 Id. (stating

that where the description of the scope of the patented invention in the public
record is unambiguous, the intrinsic record should be referred to because that is what the public
relies on).
81 Id.
The definition of terms within the specification cannot be altered because it would defeat
the public notice function. Id.
82 Id. (stating that '[a]llowing the public record to be altered or changed by extrinsic evidence
introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would make this right meaningless").
83 Id. at 1584.
84 Jd
85 Id. at 1583.
86Id. at 1584 (stating that "only if there were still some genuine ambiguity in the claims, after
consideration of all available intrinsic evidence, should the trial court have resorted to extrinsic
evidence").
87 Id. The court emphasized that "extrinsic evidence in general . . . may be used only to help
the court come to the proper understanding of the claims; it may not be used to vary or contradict
the claim language." Id.
88 Id. (declaring that another rule "would be unfair to competitors who must be able to rely on
the patent documents themselves ... in ascertaining the scope of a patentee's right to exclude").
89Id.
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The decision of the trial court, which relied on extrinsic evidence to aid in
determining an unambiguous term, was reversed by the CAFC. 9° This method was
followed by the CAFC for six years until Telegenix, which viewed extrinsic evidence
as a way to interpret a term before referring to the specification and determining the
full scope of that term. 91

B. Presumptionin Favor of the OrdinaryMeaning:' Texas Digital Systems, Inc.
v. Telegenix, Inc.
Unlike Vitronics, the Telegenix court began its interpretation by consulting a
dictionary for the ordinary meaning of the term. 92 Though the language of the
specification was deemed to be important because it functions to specify the subject
matter that is patented, the CAFC determined the claim term should be given the
ordinary meaning of the word. 93
It also stated that one useful resource for
determining the ordinary meaning of a claim term is the dictionary 94 because it
provides an unbiased definition of terms. 95 More importantly, dictionaries provide
the judge with information that can further his understanding of the terms as used
96
for the applicable technology.
The CAFC found it acceptable to use sources such as dictionaries at any stage
of the suit to aid in understanding claim terms. 97 It reasoned, however, that because
dictionaries often provide multiple definitions for one term, intrinsic evidence still
has significant value. 98 Only when taken in context can the true meaning be
ascertained. 99 In yet another contradiction, however, the court stated if more than
one definition is applicable, the terms may be construed as encompassing all of the
definitions.100

90

Td. at 1585 (concluding that because the term in dispute was "clearly and unambiguously

defined" within the specification, it was unnecessary for the lower court to rely on extrinsic evidence
to aid in defining the term).
91 See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
92 Id. at 1206, 1209. The terms "repeatedly substantially simultaneously activating", "display
areas" and "background area" were determined by first looking at the definitions in the relevant
trade dictionary. Td. The CAFC then looked to the specification to determine if the dictionary
definitions were proper. Id.
93 Id.
at 1201-02 (stating that although claim construction analysis must focus on the language
of the claims, the terms used bear a "heavy presumption" that they have the meaning a PHOSITA
would ordinarily attribute to the terms).
94 Id.
at 1202. Other useful resources include encyclopedias and treatises which aid the court
to determine the "ordinary and customary meanings of claim terms." Id.
95 Id. at 1203. Extrinsic evidence, which includes dictionaries, is unbiased because it has not
been subjected to outside influences such as expert testimony or motives of the parties. Id
9

Jd

97 See id.; see also Wang, supra note 4, at 158.

Wang states that "[d]espite, and perhaps in
light of, the past confusion over dictionaries' significance and exact role in claim construction, the
Telegenix panel firmly and enthusiastically approved the use of dictionaries in claim construction."

Id.
98

Telegeniv, 308 F.3d at 1203.

9 ) Id
100 Id.
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The intrinsic record is also used to determine if the ordinary meaning of the
word is rebutted. 1 1 If the definition within the specification is inconsistent with the
dictionary meaning, the meaning supported in the specification prevails and the
dictionary meaning is disregarded. 10 2 However, turning to the specification for the
definition of a term first may import limitations into the claim, and the definition
might be improperly constricted. 10 3 In addition, the dictionaries considered should be
those that would have been relevant to the inventor.104
For example, in Telegenix, to determine the ordinary meaning of the word
"activating," the CAFC began by consulting the Modern Dictionary of Electronics. 10 5
Because the specification did not rebut this definition, the dictionary meaning was
applied.106 Similarly, the CAFC used the Illustrated Dictionary of Electronics to
determine that the terms "display" and "background" are not interchangeable when
the ordinary meaning is considered.10 7 The intrinsic record was consistent with this
interpretation. 10
After the Telegenix decision, there has been no continuity in the way the CAFC
has interpreted claim language.

C Phillips v. AWH
Phillips v. A WH was the vehicle through which the CAFC hoped to put to rest
the uncertainty regarding the proper interpretation method for claims. 10 9 In Phillif'p,
the dispute was over the interpretation of the term "baffle."110 In the initial case, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado ("District Court") ignored the parties
stipulated dictionary definition of "baffle." ' Finding that the term was ambiguous,

101 Id at 1204. The ordinary and customary meaning of a term will be rejected when it is clear
from the specification that the intended meaning of the term is different.
102 Id.; see also Wegner, supra note 16, at 7.
103 Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1204.
104

Td. at 1205.

Id. at 1206. The term "activating" is defined in the Modern Dictionary of Electronics 20 (6th
ed. 1984) as "to start an operation, usually by application of an appropriate enabling signal." Id.
106- Id. at 1208. "We presume that the word used in a claim carries this ordinary meaning, but
this presumption may be rebutted." Id. at 1206.
107 Id. at 1209.
105

108

Id.

109 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

110 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated, 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). The issue in this case was over the use of the term "baffle" as applied within Claim 1,
which reads as follows:
Building modules adapted to fit together for construction of fire, sound and impact
resistant security barriers and rooms for use in securing records and persons,
comprising in combination, an outer shell ...
sealant means ...
and further
means disposed inside the shell for increasing its load bearing capacity
comprising internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls.
Id.at 1209-10.
111 Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-MK-212 (CBS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27298, at *33 (D.
Colo. Nov. 22, 2002) (stipulating the definition of the term "baffle" as "a means for obstructing,
impeding or checking the flow of something").
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the District Court reviewed the specification which contained both text and diagrams
that implied that "baffle[s]" were to be at any angle except ninety degrees. 112 Based
on the implications of the specification, the District Court interpreted the term to
include only the steel panels that were "at an oblique or acute angle to the face
113
wall."
Phillips appealed, believing that the claim was not limited by the specification
because the claim was not means-plus-function language. 114 Although the CAFC
agreed that the claim using the term "baffle" was not means-plus-function language,
the court ultimately found the definition of the term should have been derived from
the specification. 115 When the term is defined within the language of the
specification, explicitly or implicitly, its ordinary meaning is discounted. 116 Since the
specification of the patent contained ample evidence to define the term, the CAFC
determined that "baffle[s]" were not at ninety degrees to the face of the wall. 117 The
CAFC further determined that nothing within the specification indicated that a
"baffle" could be oriented at ninety degrees. 118 This determination was made by
consulting at the specification and the drawings within the patent claim. 119 The
majority did not attempt to determine to the plain meaning of the word in making
this decision. 120 The CAFC argued that if the term was defined any other way, the
public notice function of the specification would be defeated. 121 However, the dissent
argued that ordinary meaning should be given credence because the patentee did not
define the term within the specification. 122 If the "baffle[s]" were oriented at ninety

112

113
114

Id. at *35.
Id.
See Phillps,363 F.3d at 1210; see also MUELLER, supra note 24, at 52. 35 U.S.C. § 112

6

governs means -plus -function claiming. Id.
The statute provides that "[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and . . . shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification .... ." 35 U.S.C. § 112
6 (2000). There must be more than one
element in a claim expressed in means-plus-function terms for this to be allowed. MUELLER, suprn
note 24, at 54. This allows an element in a claim to "be claimed in terms of what the element does,
rather than what its structure is." Id. at 52. But see Wegner, supra note 16, at 6 ("the default
should be to neve-ruse a 'means' term in a claim").
'' Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1212-13.
116 Id. at 1213.
117 Id. The conclusion of the court, looking only to the language within the patent, was that
"the patentee regarded his invention as panels providing impact or projectile resistance and that the
baffles must be oriented at angles other than ninety degrees. Baffles directed at ninety degrees
cannot deflect projectiles as described .
I..."
-d.
118 Id. at 1213-14.
119 Id. at 1214. The court looked to the language in the specification which in part "states that
the baffles are 'disposed at such angles that bullets which might penetrate the outer steel panels are
deflected."' Id. (citation omitted). It also looked at drawings contained within the specifications
which showed the baffles at angles, not at ninety degrees to the panels. Id
120 Seo
121

id

Id.

122 Phills,
363 F.3d at 1217 (Dyk, J., dissenting). The dissent felt that the limitation was
"contrary to the plain meaning, and there is no suggestion that the patentee, acting as his own
lexicographer, gave a special meaning to the term baffles." Id.
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degrees, they would fulfill part of the load bearing function of the wall. 123 Thus, since
they would still perform a function, "baffle" should be interpreted as including those
at a ninety degree angle to the walls. 124 Phillips disagreed with the majority opinion
125
and petitioned for a rehearing of the case.
Phillips again appealed to the CAFC. The CAFC denied a panel hearing, but
decided to hear the case en banc in order to resolve contradictory views concerning
claim interpretation. 126 Indeed, Phillipsis a prime example of a case where applying
the two distinct methods of interpretation would yield dissimilar results. 127 Had the
definition been determined by referring to the ordinary meaning of the term as
defined in the dictionary, a "baffle" could be set at any angle, including ninety
degrees. 128 In allowing interested parties to file amicus curiae briefs, the CAFC
129
entertained multiple views to hopefully settle on a method for claim interpretation.

D. The Amicus Briefs
Pursuant to the CAFC's request, more than thirty amicus curiae briefs were
filed. 130 The majority of the briefs support the position that the specification should
be consulted first to determine the definition of terms. 131 These briefs reiterate the

123 Id. The dissent states that "the specification ... merely identifies impact resistance as one
of several objectives of the invention. The patent also identifies other objectives including 'high load
bearing strength' using 'thinner guage [sic] steel panels,' . . . and 'thermal and acoustical isolation of
two spaced walls."' Td.
124 Id. at 1218.
125 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
126 Id,
127 Compare Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1213, with Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-MK-212 (CBS),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27298, at *33 (D. Colo. Nov. 22, 2002).
128 Examples of relevant dictionary definitions of the term "baffle" are as follows: ..
. To
impede the force or movement of. n. 1. A usually static device that regulates the flow of a fluid or
light .... " THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 133 (4th ed. 2000);
"... 2 a frustrate or hinder (plans, etc.). b restrain or regulate the progress of (fluids, sounds, etc.).
n. a device used to restrain or deflect the flow of fluid, gas, sound, etc.,
THE OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 65 (1999).
129 Philps, 376 F.3d at 1383-84 (inviting interested parties to submit amicus curiae briefs
discussing the different methods of claim construction, which method is preferred, and the process
that should be followed in constructing claims).
130 See Id.;
see also Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-O: Patent Law Blog,
http://www.patentlyobviousblog.com/2004/09/phillips-.html (Sept. 23, 2004) (containing links to
amicus curiae briefs submitted to the CAFC on the issue of claim construction); Phillips v. AWH, No.
03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954, at *75 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005).
131 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association
regarding the issue of claim construction et al., Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005); Brief for Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law
Association in Support of Neither Party, Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005); Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Association, Phillips v.
AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005); Brief of Amicus
Curiae, The Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (in Support of Neither Party), Phillips
v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (United States Patent and Trademark Office) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae
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argument that only when the term is ambiguous after consulting the specification
should extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, be turned to. 132 The authors of these
briefs believe that turning first to the dictionary definition of a term severs the
necessary relationship a term has to the PHOSITA.133 The heavy presumption in
favor of the ordinary meaning of a term defeats the public notice function of the
patent claims as well as expands the scope of the term beyond its function in the
patent.134

Very few of the amici submitted briefs supporting the use of dictionaries at
the outset. However, those submitted proclaim the ultimate goal of the public notice
function is uniformity and predictability in claim construction. 135 Dictionaries aid in
this regard because there is a limited array of definitions that might be adhered to,
136
and because dictionaries are publicly available sources of information.
The majority of interested parties prefer the established method for
interpretation as set forth in Markman. However, the trend in recent decisions
clearly shows that the use of dictionaries is taking on a more important role in
interpretation.

137

E. Phillips: The Answer at Last?

Briefs]. More than twenty-five amicus curiae briefs were filed with the CAFC on this matter. See
goenerally
Posting
of
Dennis
Crouch
to
Patently-O:
Patent
Law
Blog,
http://www.patentlyobviousblog.com/2004/09/phillips-.html (Sept. 23, 2004) (comprehensive list of
amicus curiae briefs). Only a few are listed here.
132 Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1213 (stating that a patentee may overcome the presumption that a
claim term carries its ordinary meaning by distinguishing it "from prior art on the basis of a
particular embodiment, expressly disclaim[ing] subject matter, or describ[ing] a particular
embodiment as important to the invention").
133See generallyAmicus Curiae Briefs, supra note 131.
134 MUELLER, supra note 24, at 41. A PHOSITA should be able to determine what the terms
mean from the claim language. Id.
135 Brief for Amicus Curiae Parus Holdings, Inc., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, -1286); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, 1286); Brief of Amicus Curiae Patent Law Professors R. Polk Wagner & Joseph Scott Miller, Phillips
v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-1269, -1286); Brief of Amicus Curiae
International Trade Commission Trial Lawyers Association in Support of Neither Party and
Supporting Neither Reversal Nor Affirmance, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(Nos. 03-1269, -1286).
136 Brief for Amicus Curiae Parus Holdings, Inc., Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005). In its brief, the American Bar Association states that dictionaries, as
'publicly available sources carry special significance in arriving at a proper contextual meaning of a
claim term and best serve the public notice function." Brief of the American Bar Association as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 4, Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005).
137 Wang, supra note 4, at 153. To]egenix firmly established the use of dictionaries in claim
construction and "evinces the Federal Circuit's increasing preference toward a more formalistic
interpretive model of claim construction." Id.
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Recently, the CAFC handed down the long awaited en bane opinion in
Phillips v. A WH.138 The decision, which was expected to decide on one of the two
claim interpretation standards, only re-states established principles.1 39 However the
CAFC is leaning toward the method established in Markman, furthered in
Vitronies.140 The Phi'lijps court stressed that the public notice function of patent
claims is essential,14 1 and the ordinary and customary meaning of terms should be
determined from the viewpoint of a PHOSITA.14 2 However, it may be difficult to
determine exactly who a PHOSITA is if a patent encompasses multiple scientific
fields. The decision also presumes a court will understand the terms used in the
same way a PHOSITA would.1 43 Focusing on the central importance of the claim
terms and their meaning in light of the specification,1 44 the CAFC determined that
the use of dictionaries is acceptable to help determine the true meaning of the claim
terms and to aid the court in understanding the technology at issue. 145 The court,
however, stressed that this sort of extrinsic evidence is less reliable than the patent
146
itself.
The CAFC articulated that the main problem with the method in the Telegenix
line of cases is that the use of the dictionary meaning of a term limits the role the
specification plays in claim construction. 147 When the dictionary definition is not
used in conjunction with the specification, the risk is that the term will be taken out
of context and the court will depart from the intended meaning. 148 However, the

38 No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005).
139 Id. at *75-76 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at *19-20 (declaring that even though this method has been firmly established in both
Markman and Vitronics, the basic principles will be outlined again and reaffirmed).
141 Id. at *21 (stating that the court must interpret the invention as it is defined by the
patentee in the claims or risk defeating the public notice function).
112 Id. at *23 (declaring that claim interpretation begins with the "well-settled understanding
that inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the invention and that patents are
addressed to and intended to be read by others of skill in the pertinent art.").
113 Id. at *24-25 (asserting "[t]he inventor's words . . . must be understood and interpreted by
the court as they would be understood and interpreted by a person in that field of technology.").
144 Id. at *28-29 (emphasizing that because the claims are part of the specification, they "'must
be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part."').
145 Id. at *38-39.
146 Id. at *40. The CAFC then outlined numerous reasons why extrinsic evidence is less
reliable:
First, extrinsic evidence by definition is not part of the patent and does not have
the specification's virtue of being created at the time of patent prosecution for the
purpose of explaining the patent's scope and meaning. Second, while claims are
construed as they would be understood by a hypothetical person of skill in the art,
extrinsic publications may not be written by or for skilled artisans and therefore
may not reflect the understanding of a skilled artisan in the field of the
patent.... Finally, undue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk that it will
be used to change the meaning of claims in derogation of the "indisputable public
records consisting of the claims, the specification and the prosecution history,"
thereby undermining the public notice function of patents.
Id. at *40-41. The CAFC further stressed that even though it may be useful, extrinsic evidence is
'unlikely to result in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the context
of the intrinsic evidence." Id. at *41-42.
147 Id.
at *46-47.
148 Id. at *49.
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CAFC then accepted the use of dictionaries for courts' understanding of terms
because it is an unbiased source, as long as the dictionary definition does not
contradict the definition as understood from the patent documents. 149 Ultimately,
the CAFC decided not to provide a clear method for claim construction, but only a
reason why some types of evidence should be weighed more heavily than others. 150
Only after reiterating the process for claim interpretation did the court turn to
the infringement issue. The CAFC reversed the decision on the infringement issue
because it determined that a PHOSITA would not exclude ninety degree angles from
the term "baffle" and remanded the issue to the district court.151

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Consideringthe Amici
Although the proposal laid out below is supported only by a minority of the
Phillips amici, 152 it will provide more structured guidelines than the majority's
suggestion of following an interpretation method based on consulting the
specification to define terms, only referencing a dictionary when the meaning of a
term is not completely contradicted. 153 The majority argues that the language of the
specification is the most effective place to find the definition of a term. The problem
inherent in this method is that interpretations of the language vary. As such, this
method can still provide uncertainty in claim interpretation.
The other point the amici and the CAFC tend to ignore is that since the
Telegenix case, the CAFC itself began to rely on dictionaries first to get a better
understanding of the terms within the specification. This suggests that the method

149 Td. at *53-54. The CAFC further declared that "a judge who encounters a claim term while
reading a patent might consult a general purpose or specialized dictionary to begin to understand
the meaning of the term, before reviewing the remainder of the patent to determine how the
patentee has used the term." Id. at *58.
150Id. at *59.
151 Id. at *64, *68.
152 Brief for Amicus Curiae Parus Holdings, Inc., Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005); Brief of Amicus Curiae Patent Law Professors R. Polk Wagner & Joseph
Scott Miller, Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12,
2005); Brief of Amicus Curiae International Trade Commission Trial Lawyers Association in
Support of Neither Party and Supporting Neither Reversal Nor Affirmance, Phillips v. AWH, No. 031269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005).
153 See Amicus Curiae Briefs, supra note 131. In general, the majority of the amici would like
the court to revert back to the Ma-rkman method of analysis, looking at the language of the
specification first. They feel that only when there are unresolved ambiguities should the court be
allowed to look to extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, to try to help determine the meaning. Id.;
see also Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-85 (1996). The method the court prefers in the latest
Phi]ps decision. Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954, at *19-20
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (stating that the basic principles for claim construction are set out in
Markman).
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established in Markman is no longer an effective tool for the courts. This could stem
from multiple factors, among them an increase in patent litigation or the increasing
technical difficulty of patents.
The trend of the court toward a reliance on
dictionaries for the ordinary meaning of a term before interpreting the specification
itself suggests that the Markman method is no longer wholly viable and is producing
inconsistent results, a consideration that is overlooked in the recent Phlllipsdecision.

B. Methodology to IncorporateDictionaries
The most efficient method for incorporating the use of dictionaries into the
interpretation process is an iterative one. 15 4 Initially, the court should examine the
specification. If the court finds that the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer
and the term has already been defined within the specification, the analysis should
stop and the definition within the specification should be used. Likewise, if the term
is not defined within the specification but a specific dictionary is cited for referencing
the meaning of a term, that dictionary should be used, and further interpretation
should cease.
If neither, the next step will be to refer to a standard dictionary for the ordinary
meaning of the term. The court should then consult the specification again to
determine if the dictionary definition fits within the specification. If the dictionary
definition is still practical, it may be used.
Ultimately, it is important that the burden be placed on the patentee to clearly
define the terms of his claim, not the court. Because the patentee is the one who has
the most specific knowledge of the patented invention, he will be better able to define
the terms of the claim. If the patentee does not define the terms, he risks the court
narrowly interpreting the term and finding no infringement.

C. Use of a StandardDictionary
The recent trend in claim interpretation points to a more formalistic
approach. 155 Rather than using the relevant trade dictionary, a standard dictionary
156
should be used to determine the ordinary meaning of uncertain terms.

151See generallyBrief for Amicus Curiae Parus Holdings, Inc., Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, 1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005); Brief of the American Bar Association
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) [hereinafter Minority Amicus Curiae Briefs]. The general
theme running through the minority briefs is that the ordinary meaning should be first determined
from a dictionary, then the specification should be examined to determine if the patentee has
specified a different meaning within the language. Id. If there is no clear rebuttal from within the
language of the specification, the ordinary term prevails. Id.
155Johnson, supra note 4, at 521-22. Since Teegenix, the trend in claim interpretation has
been to focus on the ordinary meaning of the term through the use of a dictionary. Id.; see also
Wang supra note 4, at 153. Wang discusses the CAFC's movement toward a more formalistic
approach to claim construction. id. He goes on to discuss how the more formalistic approach will
create more predictable, efficient outcomes. Id. at 171; see also Wegner, supra note 16, at 3. "The
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A patentee should have the option available, at the time of filing, to specify a
particular dictionary for use in defining uncertain terms within the specification.
Even though the definitions within standard dictionaries will vary slightly between
the dictionaries, there is less chance for confusion than if the wrong trade dictionary
is selected. 157 Also, reliance on technical dictionaries might cause confusion because
there may be cross-over between the different fields of science (e.g., mechanical and
electrical aspects of a design), and the court might not consult the proper
dictionary. 158 In such an instance, it will be difficult for the courts, and attorneys, to

trend of the past several years toward a strict construction of claims against a careless patentee will
continue." Id.
156 A relevant
trade dictionary is a technical dictionary which may aid a judge in
understanding the technology within a claim. Vitronics, 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996). As
long as the definition in a technical dictionary is not contradicted by the claim, the dictionary
definition may be used. Id.
Examples of technical dictionaries include Modern Dictionary of Electronics; Engineering
Encyclopedia: A Condensed Encyclopedia and Mechanical Dictionary for Engineers, Mechanics,
Technical Schools, Industrial Plants, and Public Libraries, Giving the Most Essential Facts about
4500 Important Engineering Subjects.
A non-technical dictionary is a standard English dictionary (i.e. The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide, and The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language).
157 Soo Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1209. In a technical dictionary,
"display" is defined as:
[a] visually observable presentation of information ...
Illustrated Dictionary of
Electronics 147 (3rd ed. 1985). Background is defined as: "[the] context or
supporting area of a picture .... " Thus, the ordinary meaning of "display area,"
as reflected in these dictionary definitions, is an area designated to portray
information. Background is ordinarily understood to provide the context or
contrasting reference against which the displayed information is presented. The
ordinary meaning of these limitations does not indicate that the display and
background areas are interchangeable.
Id. (citations omitted).
The definition for "display" from standard dictionaries includes: "1 the act or an instance of
displaying. 2 an exhibition or show. 3 ostentation; flashiness .... 5a the presentation of signals or
data on a visual display unit, etc. b the information so presented." THE OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 275 (1999). "Display" is also defined as:
8. an act or instance of displaying; exhibition. 9.a. the giving of prominence to
particular words, sentences, etc., by the choice of types and position, as in an
advertisement, headline, or news story. b. printed matter thus displayed... 11.a.
the visual representation of the output of an electronic device. b. the portion of
the device, as a screen, that shows this representation.
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 387 (1992).
The standard definition for "background" in the same dictionaries is: "1 part of a scene, picture,
or description that serves as a setting to the chief figures or objects and foreground. 2 an
inconspicuous or obscure position .... 6 Electronicsunwanted signals, such as noise in the reception
or recording of a sound." THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 64 (1999); "1.
the ground or parts, as of a scene, situated in the rear (opposed to foreground). 5. the set of
conditions against which an occurrence is perceived . . . . 6. b. intrusive sound or radiation that
tends to interfere with the transmission or reception of electronic signals." RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 101 (1992).
158 See supra note 157. The word "demagnetizer" offers an example of a term that is trade
dependent. In the field of electronics, a demagnetizer is a "device that removes residual magnetism
from recording or playback tape heads. This magnetism, if not removed, can introduce noise on
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select the relevant trade dictionary since both an electrical and a mechanical trade
specific dictionary may both provide relevant, yet competing, definitions that are
159
unable to be distinguished within the specification.
Consulting a standard dictionary will make the language more basic and
comprehensive, forcing patentees to provide their own definitions if they intend the
meaning to be something different from the ordinary usage of the word. 160 Use of a
standard, non-technical dictionary would make the claims generic enough that the
general public would understand the meaning of the claimed invention. This in turn
would fulfill the public notice function of the patent.1 61 Furthermore, use of a nontechnical dictionary would ensure that anyone trying to ascertain the definition of a
1 62
term would have access to the same reference materials as judges.
If a word is a term of art, the patentee should either specify the dictionary from
which to draw the definition or act as his own lexicographer, so that the terms are
clearly defined within the specification itself. In the absence of a specified definition
or dictionary, the ordinary, relevant, dictionary meaning of the term should be
163
used.

D. The Patentee as His Own Lexicographer
While it will not always be clear to the patentee or patent attorney which
terms need to be defined, it is best to take a "better safe than sorry" approach. To
avoid possible ambiguities, any term of art should be defined within the specification
itself. 164 This will eliminate confusion regarding the intended definition of a term
and will disallow a potential infringer from claiming he interpreted the term to mean

recordings and cause high-frequency loss."

MODERN DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS 185 (7th ed.
1999). However, in the mechanical field, a demagnetizer is described as "[h]ardened tool-steel parts
that have been held on a magnetic chuck become permanently magnetized .. . . This residual
magnetism is objectionable for some classes of work, and a device known as a 'demagnetizer' is used
for removing it." ENGINEERING ENCYCLOPEDIA: A CONDENSED ENCYCLOPEDIA AND MECHANICAL
DICTIONARY FOR ENGINEERS, MECHANICS, TECHNICAL SCHOOLS, INDUSTRIAL PLANTS, AND PUBLIC
LIBRARIES, GIVING THE MOST ESSENTIAL FACTS ABOUT 4500 IMPORTANT ENGINEERING SUBJECTS

346 (3d ed. 1963).
The difference in the electronic and mechanical definition of the word "demagnetizer"
illustrates the problem created if the improper trade dictionary is chosen.
159 See supra note 158.
160 See Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1204 (stating that unless the patentee acts as his own
lexicographer, the presumption is in favor of the ordinary definition of the term as found in the
dictionary).
161SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Gajarsa,
J., concurring).
The clear definition of terms will further the public notice function of the
specification because the public will also be able to understand the terms. Id.
162See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996). Uniformity in the
treatment of a patent is essential to serve the public notice function; therefore, it is also essential
that the public have access to the same reference materials that judges use. Id.
163 Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1204.
164 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S.
370 (1996) (stating that ideally, extrinsic evidence would not have to be looked at because there
would be no ambiguities in the claim language).
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something entirely different from the patentee's intended meaning. Acting as his
own lexicographer will also ensure that a patentee's patent is understood as
intended.
While this extra step might be more costly during the initial patent
preparation process because the patentee and his attorney will have to pay more
attention to detailing all aspects of the patent, this extra step may function to save
165
the patentee significantly more money by avoiding an infringement lawsuit later.

V. CONCLUSION

The highly anticipated decision in the Phillipscase could have been one of the
most important decisions by the CAFC regarding claim interpretation since
Markman.166 The fact that there had previously been no consensus amongst the
judges of the CAFC on the matter of claim interpretation demonstrates the long
overdue need for rigid guidelines to direct the courts, attorneys, and patentees in
claim construction. The trend has been toward making the dictionary the primary
tool used in claim interpretation. 167 This most likely arose from a need to clarify
terms before trying to discern their meaning from confusing specification language.
The CAFC, however, disregarded this trend and used this opportunity to revert to
the method set forth in Markman.168 The likely result from this will continue to be
inconsistently decided cases as the courts again attempt to apply the rules for claim
interpretation.
The more stringent approach to interpretation, proposed above, forces the
parties involved to be more diligent when writing the specifications, ensuring that all
terms are unambiguous and well defined. The writer has two options: Specify which
dictionary to refer to for the definition of the term or act as his own lexicographer.
This will help to eliminate the confusion that comes from uncertain terms in the
language and makes for a more stable patent system.

165 See AIPLA Report, supra note 61, at 20. The average fee charged for an original patent
application of minimal complexity is $5,504 compared to an original application for a complex
invention which ranges from $8,000 to $10,000. Id.
166 Pollinger, supra note 16, at 30. Pollinger discusses the import of the Phillips case stating
that it would likely be the next landmark decision in claim interpretation. Id.
107 Johnson, supra note 4, at 521-22. Since Telegenix, the trend in claim interpretation has
been to focus on the ordinary meaning of the term through the use of a dictionary. Id.
168 Phillips v. AWH, No. 03-1269, -1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954, at *19-20 (Fed. Cir. July
12, 2005).

